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A PHILOSOPHER'S FEAST.
BY AMOS WATERS.
"Send a philosopher to London, but no poet ! '
So advised Heinrich Heine. Send a philosopher there
" and he will hear the pulse of the world beat audibly,
and see it visibly," but send no poet for the "exag-
geration of London smothers the imagination and rends
the heart." But there came one who spoke among
the philosophers with authority and preached philoso-
phy in the dialect of poets, and it is a fleeting glimpse
of his sojourn I am privileged to betray in these col-
umns. Personalia is the salt of journalism—that is
the new journalism, essentially of American origin
;
and there is consequently a touch of poetic justice in
returning the trick in prose, that you of the new world
have for good or ill, forced upon the slower mechan-
isms of the old countries.
On the evening of Saturday July 30, Dr. Paul Carus,
editor of this journal, informally received at Anderton's
Hotel, Fleet Street, a few of the more ardent and sym-
pathetic of his colleagues in propaganda who claimed
indeed to be of his soul-kindred. The gathering was
animated by every graceful impulse, and it seemed
apposite to certain grave and potent sages to depute
the writer to record in these columns a few of the
amenities exchanged. And the first propriety is to
snatch a little advantage from the editorial absence,
and convey the sense of delight we all realised in the
impressive presence of our distinguished friend. We
knew the profound thinker, the responsible moralist,
the brilliant writer with the love of the past and the
light of the future in his heart ; but we did not know
or but vaguely conjectured the alert and virile frame,
and the handsome and singularly expressive face of
the strenuous pioneer of monism. Dr. Carus is a mis-
sionary, and looks a missionary, ideally and intellect-
ually. There was a thorn in the rose, a disappoint-
ment shared by all that he was not accompanied by
another who bears his honored name.
Emerson said that there was "no end to the graces
and amenities, wit, and sensibility," of the class in
England represented however obscurely by the guests
of the visitor-host. If there was indeed no end to
these excellences, there was an admirable beginning
in the fraternal greeting voiced by Saladin in the prin-
cipal post- prandial deliverance, the toast expressed
with emotion and received with enthusiasm to the
health and in welcome of Dr. Paul Carus. "There sat
at the table Dr. Lewins, the father of Hylo-Idealism,
whose striking head the winters had whitened, and
Dr. Bithell, the Nestor of Agnosticism, equally vener-
able. The disciples of Dr. Lewins were represented
by Mr. George M. McCrie and Mr. Ellis Thurtell, M. A.
Mr. Chas. A. Watts, editor of The Agnostic Annual and
Watts''s Literary Guide, the Napoleon of English liber-
alism was there, and also Mr. J. Harrison Ellis and Mr.
Frederick Millar, editor of The Liberty Annual. Mr.
Hermann Hegeler sat to the right of Dr. Carus. But
for an unfortunate mistake in the hurry of arrange-
ment, the group had been larger and more diversified.
However, the interesting editor of The AgnosticJournal
discoursed brilliantly of philosophy and poetry in the
three lands familiar in the affections of Dr. Carus
—
Germany, England, and America,—sometimes witty,
sometimes pathetic, and always eloquent. Then we
tried our national institution, " For he's a jolly good
fellow." It may be remarked that some philosophers
can eat who cannot sing. Dr. Carus in reply spoke
with excessive modesty, but with thought and generous
feeling, and intensified the favorable impression gen-
erally conceived. He spoke of his spiritual pilgrimage
and a little of his earthly trials. Once he paused, and
evidently possessed by sincere and dignified affection
unburdened his mind and heart of a noble tribute to
Mr. Edward C. Hegeler. It was a touching and rev-
erent estimate.
Other toasts were proposed and expanded includ-
ing "The Liberal Press," with which the names of Mr.
Ellis Thurtell and Mr. Hermann Hegeler for England
and America were respectively associated. And when
the toasts were ended the conversation was vivacious
and intellectual. Perhaps the conversational incident
was a' subtle-issued tournament between the editors
of The Open Court and The Agnostic Journal, and for
long all were content to listen as the merits of monism
and agnosticism were severally revealed. Most in-
teresting, too, were the communings between Dr.
Carus and Dr. Lewins. As the night grew the tone
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of gravity deepened while yet the light graces of fes-
tivity were not forgotten. The philosophers were tak-
ing a holiday, and the joyous recreation of Hafiz with
its serious echo might have been the motto cherished
in the thoughts of all. "Let us be crowned with
roses, let us drink wine, and break up the tiresome
old roof of heaven into new forms." Hovering over
the circle was an Empyrean of calm beatitude, mystic
and fragrant incense soaring from the altar of Diva
Nicotina who found just votaries in the grateful
majority.
One final word may be permitted in expression of
a thought which has long constrained me, and which
was strengthened during that memorable evening.
Between tTie monism of Dr. Carus and The Open Court,
and the agnosticism of many—especially of the rever-
ent school—in England, the difference is mainly tech-
nical. Agnosticism is essentially idiosyncratic and
may not crystallise into any dogma, "unknowable,"
or other untenable refuge of halting mentalities. The
strict Spencerians are an isolated and decreasing fac-
tion, whose arid pedantries are alien to the brighter
spirits of the agnostic movement. With all respect I
venture to say that the feud accentuated by Dr. Carus
is based on a fallacious and penurious, if pardonable
assumption. In truth it has on occasion been gravely
questioned, as to whether "agnostic " adequately con-
veys the intent of the group of propositions it covers.
Dr. Carus has acceptably concerned himself with the
conciliation of religion with science, and he has vitally
rescued beautifurtruths from old and decaying creed-
abstractions. In his interpretations of God and Soul,
he envisages issues with enduring wisdom and pro-
phetic ardor. It will, therefore, be acutely discourag-
ing, if his sojourn on these shores does not intimately
convince him that it is possible and desirable to effect
a reconciliation between the monism of his choice and
the agnosticism of his objection.
MISS NADEN'S "WORLD-SCHEME."
A RETROSPECT.
by george m. mc crib,
[concluded.]
A position such as that defined in the last para-
graphs of Part II of this paper, of course meets with
the fiercest criticism. Neither the idealist nor the real-
ist of our day will submit to the wear of a cosmical
ego. Hence a reviewer in the Journal ofMental Science
(April 1892), Miss Naden's latest critic, puts it as
follows. 1
"Miss Naden ... is possessed by two currents of
"thoughts, which she conceives her theory to recon-
I / 'ide appendix to Tract " Sadducee versus Pharisee " in which the criti-
cism in question is reprinted entire.
"cile. She is very clear that, to us, there is no out-
"side world—that every 'thing' is a 'think,' as Dr.
" Lewins strangely states it—and that, in fact, each
"man makes his own universe .... But she is at the
"same time, equally assured of the effective material-
"ity of the universe ^ ... . How did Miss Naden
"reconcile her two cardinal lines of thought? How,
'
' if the world is a vision
—
possibly a mirage or drunken
"dream-—how can I posit any difference between the
" real and the unreal, the true and the false? How, in
"a word, can I know anything about it?^ Are we not
"referred back to that 'Scepticism of Hume* which
"etc.'?. . . . Truth and error, reality and unreality,
"right and wrong, beauty and hideousness, are noth-
" ing but the fancies of the hourl^ The truth is, surely,,
"that the test and basis of the whole matter is what
"testt! of reality one's scheme of philosophy can pro-
" vide. "' That our universe is made up of phenomena,
"all thinking persons will agree.** That in some
" sense it is nevertheless real is obvious to all who are
"not in a lunatic asylum, and to many who are.
^
'
' But the explanation of the meaning of reality 1 •> is the
"crux of the philosopher, as the discernment of it is
" often the test of the lunatic."^
^
The gist of the foregoing criticism is that in Miss
Naden's auto-cosmic synthesis a "standard" of truth
and reality is lacking. But if this standard is to be
external, the bounds of "the universe as felt and
known" must be transcended in order to discover it.
And if internal, then one part of the universe must be
employed to check the remainder. But all ideas of a
1 Yes; and why should .she not be so assured ? " Materiality," even effect-
ive materiality is not necessarily a quality of " outsidedness." Everything
characterising it is a mental endowment. And when the ego is coterminous
with the cosmical sphere of thought, materiality is seen to be necessarily in-
side, not outside the limit. If anything were outside us we could have neither
part nor lot in it. The critic is misled by the use of the terms " think " and
"spectral." These are not unrealities. All things are spectral. But the
is everything.
2 But " a mirage or drunken dream " is as much within consciousness as
anything else. The critic seems to think that because these chance to be
wrongly related—unreal in certain relations—they are not within the sphere
of the ego. But unreality in certain relations is reality in others, absolute un-
reality is nonentity.
3 By being it ; to know is to be.
4 No, the Scepticism ofHume does not touch the point. Hume did not
admit a "conscious subject*' at all. though his theory—really a string of im-
pressions illegitimately bound together in a series—sorely needed one. The
subject-object relation of auto-monism, on the other hand, is conscious all
through.
5 Well, what of this ad captandum appeal ? Everyone of these is in con-
sciousness, and what has " the fancy of the hour" to do with it ? The critics
review, is it not the fancy of the hour ? and yet he wishes it taken au serieuA-.
6 The test is the test, unquestionably—whatever anything is really, it is
unalterably.
7 As " the real is everything " there can be no such test.
8 '^All thinking persons" do not so agree, so it resolves into a "count of
heads."
9 A lunatic is only tested by the comparision of his speech and actions
with those of others presumably sane. Viz., by means of relation.
10 "Explanation of the meaning of a reality," itself requires explanation.
11 A universe, as it includes everything, cannot be tested by anything else.
Internal cozm\c^\ relations are tested by their unalterabieness.
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standard are, in this connection, out. of place. Such
a standard must either be absokite, (when its own
reality in turn would have to be guaranteed by some-
thing else and so on, in endless regress,) or it must be
relative, when it would only take its place among the
other relations of its own sphere. When the critic
leaves the sober and waking conclusion of ever3'day
life, which with him seem alone to count for "reali-
ties," and seeks to find ////realities in such things as
"drunken dreams," "mirages," etc., which are every
whit as real, in their own relations, as anything else,
we need not follow him further. Let us endeavor,
rather, to define Miss Naden's position more particu-
larly. In what follows, the standpoint of the Journal
of Mental Science reviewer will be found to be more
and more untenable.
Observe the extremes between which auto-monism
is the golden mean. Absolute idealism and absolute
realism may both be reckoned out of court. But be-
tween these theories there are median systems each
with its measure of plausibility. There is first, and
leaning to the persuasion of idealism, what may, on
that account, be termed indeterminate idealism, that
half-way system of thought which, positing an ego
—
mental or material or both—bridges the gap between
it and the "objective universe," by means of hypo-
thetical figments, such as vibrations, undulations, etc.
Throughout the cosmos a dividing-line is drawn ; on
the one side the subjective, on the other the objective.
Thinkers of this persuasion are not deterred appar-
ently by the discovery that, if this dividing-line exists,
if between the ego of the cosmos, and the non-ego of
the cosmos, there be a distinction at all, the dividing-
line in question must, at one extremity, invade the
atomic province, rendering any "indivisible particle"
an impossibility. And this objection is but faintly
met when it is urged that the "indivisible particle " is
hypothetical merely, inasmuch as it becomes evident
sooner or later, that it will not serve to construct a
cosmical edifice upon a purely hypothetical basis.
Then second, there is indeterminate realism, the recoil
from the foregoing theory. The upholders of this sys-
tem, having discovered the importance of "sensa-
tions" in the construction of a cosmos, describe them
as "elements," and practically abandon the ego alto-
gether by saj'ing that it, the ego, is not here, or there,
or novihere, but virtually (7//vwhere. Where the sen-
sations or elements are, there is an ego in the midst of
them; where a complex of elements, ex. gr. that called
"green " is, the / is there. And should the ego drop
out, should the / die, there is an end of the "green."
What remains is not clear, but "green," or, at all
events, that particular greenness exists no longer.
"That is all," we are told. Apparently no great loss !
The contingency of any element, other than the ego.
"dropping out" is not faced, so far as we can inter-
pret Professor Mach and his school.
Though not, perhaps, on the surface, these two
thought-systems resolve into absolute idealism, and
absolute realism, respectively. In the first, we have
an ego p/its hypotheses of stimulation. This is really
nothing more than the subject ////j various possibili-
ties of its being affected, touched to the issues of sen-
sation. Under cover of these possibilities of affection,
the objective, pure and simple, actually disappears.
For, if you imagine an object, distinct from subject,
a non-ego fronting an ego, all the available terminol-
ogy of philosophy will not suffice to express a relation
between these two at once close enough to correspond
with the ordinar}', recognised facts of perception, and
sufficiently marked to preserve the supposed distinc-
tion. Accordingly in indeterminate idealism a bridge
of hypothesis is added, undulations, vibrations, atomic
and odorous particles. But these devices, in the end,
prove useless. Link them to the subjective you may,
but not to the objective, except at the cost of annihi-
lating objectivity itself. Once you bring in vibrations,
etc., you practically provide a second object, which is
really a part of the subject, and, in order to do this,
you have taken from the original objective all that
composed it. ^ And a corresponding impasse awaits
indeterminate realism. The hypothetical medium be-
tween non-ego and ego being in this case abandoned,
the readiest method seems to be to submerge ego in
non-ego, and allow it there to take its chance. At
first sight this plan seems feasible enough. It appears
to suit the case to regard the ego as nothing more
than a factor in, or element of, a complex; conscious-
ness, sensation, perception, all rising spontaneously
in the instant of grouping. Self-consciousness, in-
deed, is persistent, but why not treat that as an illu-
sion ? though of what, or to what, does not appear.
Unfortunately, the theory has this weak point in it,
that, if you admit "the complex," you enter the re-
gion of hypothesis once more. Just as, in indetermi-
nate idealism, the non-ego could not be brought suffi-
ciently near to the ego without the help of a hypothet-
ical figment, so, in indeterminate realism, the two
cannot be sufficiently separated to serve the required
purpose. In the one case, the ego is too far distant
from its counterpart ; in the other too near. For, in
"the complex," the ego, being practically on a level
with the other elements, itself part, and part only, of
I In Dr. Brewer's pamphlet Constance Naden and Hylo-Idealism, from
which we have already quoted, there is an instance of this virtual superses-
sion of the object. Unfortunately the writer fails to supply the necessary
Hylo-Ideal Correction. " Some stars may be extinct before the telegram of
their once existence reaches our earth, so that we are seeing what does not
even exist. . . . The spectator could not cognise them till their messages ar-
rived, and even then he only received a telegram, and not the r,-s ipsissima.
The objects, however, must have existed, or no messenger could have been
sent from their courts," pp. lo-ii.
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the composition of say, "green— " without which
green, or that particular greenness "would not be—
"
can never sufficiently divorce itself from the combina-
tion of which it is a factor, in order to be able to sense
it. Even as knowledge, in the sense of perception,
of the component terms of a series, one by one, can-
not bring us, by itself, to knowledge of the series as a
series, so neither can one element of a complex pre-
sent the complex to itself. The complex is stable so
long as all its elements are present, and no longer ;
but, while it is thus constant, there is nothing left to
which the complex can be, and a hypothetical supreme
consciousness, such as Professor Green, in his system,
ultimately introduces, becomes a logical necessity,
"something out of time, for which all the terms of the
relations are equally present, as the principle of the
synthesis which unites them in a single universe." i
As long as the separation of subject from object is,
even nominally, insisted upon, so long must either of
these "blind-alleys" be selected. You cannot bring
the not I into the /, without the former slipping into
the gulf, or bog rather, of hypothesis, where it per-
ishes. You cannot logically have anything else than
a purely supposititious, " consciousness other than the
events and not passing with them," if you draw the
ego into the sphere of the non-ego.
In the thought-system to which Miss Naden dedi-
cated her maturer years, the very noon-tide of her
life, we have the true Eirenicon between idealism and
realism. Not only the "distance" but the apparent
objectivity of the "external" world resolves into the
outcome of an acquired sense-process, and its sepa-
rateness, or "outsidedness " into an illusion. ^ The
whole of the immemorial tangle of subjectivity and
objectivity rights itself at once. But perhaps the
"conclusion of the whole matter" may best be indi-
cated by adducing the view which is the exact oppo-
site of the true one. We find it in Professor Mach's
words, part of the article in The Monist already quoted
from.
"That Protean, illusory philosophical problem of
"a single independent thing with many properties,
"arises 'from the misunderstanding of the fact that
"extensive comprehension, and accurate separation,
"although both are temporarily justifiable, and profit-
"able for a number of purposes, cannot, and must
"not, be employed simultaneously.''''
But they can, and must, be so employed. It is
precisely this deprecated "extensive comprehension
and accurate separation," simultaneously employed,
I Prolegomena to Ethics, Introduction, p. 71.
2 A recognised, and rationalised, "illusion," however, like the "rising"
and " setting " of the sun. Similarly, an intricacy of nerve-process is respon-
sible, inter alia, for that familiar feeling of having been, at some indefinitely
remote period of our lives, identically circumstanced as at present, a feeling
out of which mysticism has attempted to make much capital."
which reveals the ego-universe system as a single
thing with many properties, the true unity of the
manifold. The revelation of the barrenness of Pro-
fessor Mach's intellectual Canaan is the index of the
fulness of the true Land of Promise. Simultaneous
analytico-synthetic vision is a necessity. "The king-
dom is within us,'" yet, in order to realise this fact,
that which seems to be, but is not "outside'" must be
included. This is Mvhy "near and far," with Miss
Naden, were " quite indifferent." (Cf. Reliques, Appx.
p. 243.') Once grasp the thesis, that subject and ob-
ject are indissolubly one, not in the hackneyed sense
of inter relation, but in that of identity, and you have
the complete reconcilement of all seeming contradic-
tions.
The hollowness of any such rationale as, for ex-
ample, that given by Dr. Cleland regarding the sense
of smell, is evident from this standpoint. The intro-
duction of a supposititious " odorous particle," as a ve-
hicle of communication between the physical object
and subject, is as superfluous as would be any such
figment in pure philosophy. The so-called "stimulant
of sensation" is as unverifiable as an "animating
spirit," or as that " appulse " which Fichte dreamed
of. The ego includes the whole of the cosmical situa-
tion.
That this rationale is not patent on the surface of
ordinary perception arises from the fact that the ap-
parent externality of the object ^ which is simply a
question of perspective or adjustment, seems to nega-
tive its unity with the subject. Yet the burden of
proving separation rests with the separatists. For
deeper examination reveals the truth that unless the
object is found to coalesce with the subject, there
could be no percepton at all; perception, in the vul-
gar sense, implying something acting where it is not.
In a sense profounder far than the familiar Neo- Kan-
tian dictum, partial knowledge is impossible. To
know, not fully, but to know at all, is to Be. -
The various corollaries of this synthesis, as ex-
pounded in Miss Naden's essays, cannot be dwelt
upon in this paper, but two points of the utmost im-
portance, in the light of modern controversy, are
made clear by it. They can only be mentioned.
i) Such terms as subject, object, relation, matter,
1 Even if " externality " resided where it is popularly supposed to reside,
viz. in front of 'us, we could not see it, in the popular sense; the essential
factors in vision, the rods and cones of the retina, pointing, not "outwards"
but inwards, and backwards.
280 accustomed are we to the subject-object rationale that its contradic-
tions and absurdities are not reckoned with. The commonplace of vulgar re-
alism, " I perceive a tree " is, on the plane of subject-object separation, quite
unintelligible. Here is an object, which, in some mysterious way, affects the
subject so as to incorporate its qualities with the latter, and yet, at the same
time remains itself unmoved and unchanged, which may, at the same time
affect any number of subjects, yet which remains one and the same undimin-
ished object still. The truth is that unless I am that which I perceive, psr-
ception is an impossibility.
THE OPEN COURT. 5363
etc., are now seen, not to be meaningless, but to pos-
sess an added meaning. They do not correspond,
however, to any fixed or definite distinction. Take
the much-vexed question of "matter" for example.
Matter is no independent entity. In the strict sense
of the term, the material of the cosmos—so long as
unity is preserved—becomes "indifferent." The
query "if thing is but 'think,' what, then, is matter?"
is seen to answer itself. Matter is just what—and as
—
it is thought to be.
2) In the auto-cosm all is rigidly egoistic. All
"foreign centres of representations" in which some
have supposed "the true external world " to reside,
must assume their proper subordinate place. The
existence of "other selves, " being secondarily inferred,
in no way touches the prime fact of solipsismal
monism.
THE BASIS OF MORALITY.
BY C. STANILAND WAKE.
If, however, all conduct be subjectively alike, the difference
between its several phases must be objective. The distinction
may best be made plain by an explanation of what is meant by
iiiuuoral. This is any conduct which is contrairy to good "man-
ners," using this term in its widest sense, as expressed in the laws,
written or unwritten, of society, the observance of which is there-
fore morality. The laws must have been established, otherwise
they could not be observed, but they cannot be said to have
preceded the conduct to which they have reference. Command
and conduct were developed together as effects of each other.
"Thou shalt not steal," implies the existence of thieving, as well
as the recognition of the immorality of the conduct forbidden.
It has often been remarked that all primitive legislation takes the
negative form. This is consistent with the fact that passive
morality is the most essential to the existence of society, and it
must therefore have been the soonest developed. Negative virtue
is of no less importance, however, in all stages of social progress,
not only on account of its restraining quality, but because it enters
into the duly which every man owes to his "neighbor," that is, to
the other social unit or units with whom he is brought into contact
in the course of daily life. Everyone is entitled to his "due," and
if one is kept from it by any person, this person is guilty of a
breach of the command " thou shalt not steal "; a law which is not
limited to simple theft, but extends to all active or passive conduct
by which any one is deprived of any object or benefit to which he
is entitled. It is thus difficult to find any action affecting another
person besides the agent, that does not possess an ethical element.
This enters into the most ordinary conduct, but in actions which,
although performed for the benefit of others, are prompted by
egoistic motives—as services rendered for reward—the ethical ele-
ment is of an incidental character, and therefore need not be
regarded in the classification of such actions, which may be prop-
erly described as intellectual, rather than moral. The objective
distinction between ethical and other conduct is, therefore, to be
found in their chief intention, that is the motive by which an
action is guided, or the end it has in view. If an action has for
itschief-aim the good or injury of another, it is moral or immoral,
as the case may be, but if the benefit to the agent is the guiding
principle of an act, it is morally indifferent, e\ce"pt where such
benefit can be obtained only by injury to another person.
But let it be noticed that all actions, whether or not they
possess the ethical character, have an important objective feature
in common. Conduct that is morally indifferent, that is, which
has a purely intellectual object, such as is required for the per-
formance of any kind of labor, is said to be "right" if it is fitted
to attain the end in view. We have here fundamentally the same
idea as when we speak of an action being morally right ; as is
evident if we apply to it, as we may, the term proper. What
belongs to a man is his "property," that is, he has a right to it,
and any action which interferes with this right is improper. In
like manner, any action that is fitted for the acquirement of a
property-right, or to attain a particular end, is said to be proper
for that purpose, but if the action is not so fitted it is spoken of as
improper or not proper. Now, in each of these cases the "pro-
priety" or "impropriety" is simply rightness or wrongness, that
is, fitness or unfitness for a particular purpose, the nature of
which, and not the mental activity, stamps conduct as ethical or
otherwise. The same conclusion may be arrived at by considering,
not the special aim sought to be attained by any particular action,
but the general object of such action. No act is performed vo-
luntarily unless it is thought to be, in some way or other, benefi-
cial to somebody—either to the person affected by it or to the
person acting. Even wrong or immoral actions have this quality,
as the agent intends to benefit himself directly or indirectly,
affectively or effectively, whatever injury he may do to another.
Actions morally indifferent may benefit the agent alone, but in
many cases they are beneficial to both the agent and the recipient.
This is the case also with actions having an ethical character, since
not only do they directly affect others, but indirectly, or by reflex
influence, they affect the agent as well, beneficially or otherwise.
The subjective agreement of ethical and intellectual conduct
is thus confirmed by reference to the ultimate consequences of
actions, and it may be further proved by a consideration of the
nature of conscience. This is sometimes spoken of as the " moral
sense," as though the organism possesses a special sense for the
distinction of the moral quality of actions. Bearing in mind,
however, what has been said above as to the subjective agreement
of ethical and intellectual conduct, we shall be prepared to find
that conscience is merely a special phase of consciousness, using
this term in its widest sense as answering in the intellectual region
to the general sensibility in the region of feeling. As a fact, in
some languages the same word is used to denote both conscious-
ness and conscience, as though their fundamental connection was
recognised ; as it is in the phrase "moral consciousness." Never-
theless, although conscience is subjectively the same as conscious-
ness, yet it has special ohjeetive relations owing to which the term
moral sense has come to be applied to it. The true relation of
consciousneES to conscience is made apparent by reference to
Lewes's distinction between faculty and fuiicliou. The function is
the activity of an organ, answering to the use of an instrument.
The term faculty has also been employed in that general sense,
but Lewes proposed to limit it to " the action or class of actions
into which a function may be diversified by the education of ex-
perience." Function would thus stand for the jw/Zrv endowment
of the organ, and faculty for its acjuireJ variations of activity.
Thus if consciousness is the function of the intellect, the acquired
activities of consciousness must be its faculties, and such is the
case with conscience, which, as the faculty of the intellect con-
cerned with ethical questions, may be properly termed the moral
faculty
;
just as taste is the sesthetic faculty, and speech the lin-
guistic faculty. All these faculties have the same subjective basis
in consciousness, and therefore they are all expressions of the
intellectual function, although they differ objectively as having to
do each with a special group of phenomena, those which owing to
their relationship are bound together by the law of association.
The operation of any faculty may be so continuous in a particular
direction, as by affection of the sensibility to form a special dis-
position, constituting a law of action, any infraction of which
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may be felt as a shock to the feeling of propriety in relation to
that particular line of conduct; just as action in another relation
may give a shock to the moral conscience. When any doubt arises
as to the fitness or propriety of any such action it is referred to
the intellect for regulation, and as this applies to the moral as
well as the jesthetic and intellectual faculties, we have here further
evidence that all conduct, whatever its aim, is subjectively allied,
and has a common basis in the general sensibility or in conscious-
ness, according to whether it is habitual or otherwise. In either
case the sensibility is affected, for, as Lewes shows, all knowledge
begins and ends in feeling, which includes intelligence no less than
sensation, and in accordance only with which thought itself has
validity.
We are now in a position to poitat out the direction in which
must be sought the basis of positive morality, the source of the
moral obligation which expresses itself in conscience. The vari-
ability in the teaching of the moral faculty, as shown in the codes
of morals current in different ages of the world and among different
peoples in the same age, shows us that conscience cannot be de-
pended on to determine the absolute moral value or quality of
any particular action ; although this may perhaps be affirmed
where, as in the case of theft or homicide within the tribe, there
is a universal consensus of opinion as to the immoral nature of
such action. What has to be explained is the existence of the
principle which finds expression in the moral conscience, or in
other words the existence in the mind of the conception of "right
and wrong " as an active test of conduct. Stated in this manner
the problem under consideration is reduced to its simplest form,
and practically it is resolved into a question of the origin of general
ideas, which is that of the mental constitution itself. The mode
of formation of general ideas is pointed out by Mr. Lewes when
considering the source of man's superiority over animals. He
states that objects, except as motives, do not exist for the animal.
"He has no power of abstraction capable of constructing ideas of
objects, he has only sensation and imagination representing
sensibles. But ideas, expressed in words, are not sensible objects;
they are mental constructions, in which relations abstracted from
things are woven afresh into a web of sensibles and extra-sensibles,
and concrete particulars become concrete generals. The experi-
ence of red is detached from the sensible experiences which origi-
nally accompanied it by being separately named. Red is then
any red. Never being isolated in experience, red could only be
isolated in thought by means of some sign which should give it
separate embodiment ; the sign thus particularising it, separating
it, can by virtue of this detachment be applied to all similar
occasions. The particular thus becomes generalised, and may
become a sign of other qualities held in common by red objects."'
The power of abstraction on which depends the formation of
the concrete generals, implies not only the possession of the power
of inhibitive thought or reflection, but also the faculty of language
by which the abstraction is named and thus identified as a general
idea or concept. The construction of the concept right or wrong
must have followed exactly the same course as the formation of
the general idea of red. It is true that, while the latter is a
quality of sensible objects, the former is a quality of actions. But
right and wrong had relation originally to objects. The connection
between right and proper has already been pointed out, and there
can be no doubt that the idea of right was at first associated with
property. A man was recognised as being entitled to, that is,
as having a right to, what he had produced or acquired by his
independent labor. At first the quality of "rightness" would not
be separated from the objects which were thus regarded as be-
longing to a particular individual, but in the course of time the
activity of the intellect led to the recognition of that quality in
thought so as by abstraction to become a general idea. The idea
of right would thus be fixed in language as a concept, just as with
the general idea "red."
Proceeding a step further, we find by the law of relativity every
feeling is presented under a twofold aspect. As pointed out by
Lewes, change in relations is the psychological condition of feel-
ing, and unless such a change takes place there can be no con-
sciousness. The twofold aspect is the alternation of abstractions,
and all feeling and all thought being necessarily relative, the
relation has two terms, one of which cannot be dominant in con-
sciousness without throwing the other into obscurity, but nei|ther
of them can be thought without calling up the other." ' It must
be remembered, however, that there are two kinds of correlatives,
those which are logical and those which are real. The difference
is that between contrairies and contradictories, and applying the
distinction to the idea of right, we see that it has for correlatives
non-right and not-right or wrong. The former of these terms has
reference to the mere right of property, and is an affirmation that
the right does not exist ; whereas the latter affirms the right but
declares that it is interfered with, and that such interference is
wrong. In this declaration of not-right, which was due to the
activity of intellect, we have the genesis of a moral idea, that is
the clothing of the idea of right with the moral attribute. By the
law of relativity the idea possesses the twofold aspect, and the
idea of right would be called up by that of wrong, just as the idea
of wrong would be suggested by that of right. The completed or
perfect concept would, however, include more than this. The
negative conduct inust be endowed with the moral quality, which
can be affected only by affirming that it is a duty to abstain from
doing what is not-right or wrong.
Thus we see that so far from there being no basis for positive
morality, it possesses the firmest of all bases, that of human nature
itself. Moral conduct, like all other action, is governed by the
laws of the mental constitution, that is, the laws of human nature,
which are nevertheless merely the expression in the human
organism of the laws of physical and cosmical existence. It is in
accordance with human nature that actions are right or wrong,
and as conduct is the expression of the will, its character or
identity will depend on the disposition, of which organic condition
conduct is the functional activity. The moral nature of an act
can be determined only by its intended eff'ect. If this is good, as
being in accordance with the Golden Rule which requires the
exercise of self-control in action, arising from a consideration for
the rights of others, it is morally right. If, however, it takes no
heed of the rights of others, and does harm instead of good, it is
morally wrong. Conduct is thus the expression, in accordance
with the laws of the mental constitution, of the positive and
negative or aggregative and separative aspects of the disposition.
This is the objective view of moral conduct, but we must
look for its, actual basis to the subjective side of human nature.
Possibly the evil consequences of a particular action may not have
been desired by the agent, that is, may not have been in accordance
with his disposition at the time of its performance. The disposition
is the condition for the time being of the sentient organism or
sensibility as the result of experience, and it is to be judged of by
reference to the motives which govern its expression in action,
that is whether pleasure or pain is derived from the consideration
of actions having the qualities of goodness or badness. According
to Mr. Bain, pleasure and pain operate as the motives in will.
Those affections of the sensibility must ultimately, however, be
referred to the sentient organism, and hence, although where
action is automatic or habitual the muscular sensation of pleasure
or pain may defermine conduct, yet in other cases the conduct is
referred to the intellect, by the operation of which light is thrown
Problems of Life and Mind, III. P. 486.
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on motives to action when presented in consciousness. When the
intellect is called into play it regulates the will in its activity and
ensures that conduct shall be guided by reason, which can be only
through observance of the primary laws of thought. If the mental
disposition is such that the illuminating influence of consciousness
can have its proper effect, reflection on what is good will give
pleasure, while pain will be experienced at the thought of evil.
If, on the other hand, the condition of the sentient organism is
such that the intellect cannot exercise its proper action the op-
posite result must ensue. For the expression of the will in con-
duct depends in the ultimate resort on the disposition, which is
the sum of the influences arising from the condition of the general
sensibility.
We thus see that the ultimate basis of morality is to be found
in the sentient organism itself. Lewes points out that "from the
varieties of feeling we extricate certain constant appearances which
we call laws of sensibility, forms of thought, logical rules. These
we describe and classify, as we describe and classify the planes of
cleavage of crystals. But to suppose that these laws have an
a priori independence, and render our feelings and knowledge
possible, is equivalent to the supposition of planes of cleavage
floating about in the cosmos, and when descending upon certain
solutions fashioning them into crystals." Mental forms have no
more existence apart from the sentient organism, than have the
experiences which result from the reaction of the organism to the
stimulation of the external medium. Thus as the organism itself
forms the ultimate basis of all experience, in it must be found the
basis of positive morality, which is the expression of certain phases
of experience in relation to the exigencies of social life. Neverthe-
less, the social medium itself must not be lost sight of as an
important factor in the development of morality. Lewes shows
that we must seek outside of the organism and its inherited apti-
tudes for the origin of a large portion of our mental life, and he
states that "we can find it only in the constitution of the social
organism of which we are the units. We find there the impersonal
experiences of tradition accumulating for each individual a fund
of knowledge, an instrument of power which magnifies his
existence. The experiences of many become the guide of each ;
they do not all perish with the individual ; much survives, takes
form in opinion, precept, and law, in prejudice and superstition.
The feelings of each are blended into a general consciousness,
which in turn reacts upon the individual consciousness. And this
mighty impersonality is at once the product and the factor of social
evolution. It rests on the evolution of language, as a means of
symbolical expression by the stimulus of collective needs," and
therefore, as we have seen, without language there can be no
intellectual or moral life ; no tradition, and therefore no religion,
science, or art. (Psychology, p 80.)
The general mind is resolvable, however, into the experiences
of individual minds, and the further back we trace its beginnings
the fewer the units which constituted the social organism, and the
more simple the teachings of that experience. Moreover, although
without the social organism the development of intellectual and
moral life would have been wanting, yet its foundations are laid
in the mental constitution of each individual, and the true basis of
morality, as of intelligence, must be sought in human nature itself.
This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that man alone is a moral
creature. The lower animals have the elements of morality as of
intelligence, due to their possession of a sentient organism, but in
the absence of self- consciousness there can be no moral or logical
development, no idea of "right" or "wrong" in relation to con-
duct, and no language in which to give form to such conceptions.
This is dependent on the e.xercise of the "thought," and as this
function is the special heritage of mankind, we must conclude
that positive morality is the expression of the laws of human nature
in response to social influences.
CURRENT TOPICS.
In a moment of poetic enthusiasm Pope exclaimed, " For
forms of government let fools contest, that which is best adminis-
tered is best"
; a melodious bit of sophistry which has led many
minds to undervalue the importance of set principles in the polit-
ical organism of a state. The doctrine may be erroneous, but the
opinion of the poet is not without wisdom after all, for essential
principles moulded into a "form" of government may be so ex-
cessively protected by the checks and balances of written con-
stitutions, as to become fetters on liberty, and vetoes on the peo-
ple's will. A monarchy in form may be harnessed in such a way
as to be in its practical operations a democracy in fact ; and of
this Great Britain is a picturesque example. On the other hand,
a democracy in form can be so " regulated" as to work like a
monarchy
; and of this the United States of America is a collossal
illustration.
In England constitutions grow ; in America they are made
;
and thus it is that the British constitution fits the time, and with
a moral force beyond the strength of armies it compels the govern-
ment to yield at once to a democratic mandate given at a general
election. In the United States the administration, or even the
senate, may treat the popular verdict with royal and imperial
contempt. On the 28th of June, the British Parliament was dis-
solved, and a new election ordered. At the end of a " campaign "
some three weeks long the election was over, and the will of the
voters known. A week or two after that the new Parliament met
and the Commons, not the Lords and Commons, but the Com-
mons, promptly changed the administration by hinting to Lord
Salisbury that they had no "confidence" in his policy. His Lord-
ship took the hint and at once resigned his office. Although the
Senate, or the House of Lords, as they call it over there, was in
favor of Lord Salisbury by more than two to one it counted noth-
ing ; the Senate, even if unanimous, could not save him. The
will of the democracy must be obeyed. Lord Salisbury himself
is a member of the senate, and it became his duty to inform his
brother Senators that he had been dismissed from oflice by the
Commons; not in those words exactly, but in these, " My Lords,
owing to the vote of ' no confidence ' adopted by the House of
Commons, the ministers have resigned their offices, and our res-
ignations have been accepted by the queen." Lord Salisbury qui-
etly hands the reins to the queen, and she turns them over to
Mr. Gladstone ; that is all. In less than two months from the
death of the old parliament, not only the offices, but also all po-
litical power and responsibility have been transferred from one
party to the other. Nothing so republican as this can be found
anywhere else in the world. It is democracy in action ; under the
form of monarchy.
* *
On the result of the general election in Great Britain de-
pended all the government, and every question of public policy.
The democracy demanded everything, and the monarchy made no
resistance to the claim. No such radical consequences depend on
the national election here, however emphatic the popular verdict
may be on either side. Our campaign began earlier than the
other, and it will continue longer. From early June, when the
conventions meet, until November, the party chieftains drill their
battalions in the manual of party dicipline, and organize them for
the battle of the ballot boxes ; on the assumption that the .Ameri-
can people are fools by a large majority, and that it is necessary
to keep them so until after the election. All through the summer
and the autumn, we hear the hewgag of the stump orator while the
band plays " listen to the mocking bird," and the torch-light pro-
cessions illuminate the land from Portland, Maine, to Portland,
Oregon. All this is very democratic. in appearance and in sound,
but the verdict at the end has no substance in it, for it may be
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scornfully set aside by the House of Lords, or as we call it here,
the Senate. Though Mr. Cleveland should be elected, with a
democratic House of Representatives, it would not give the demo-
cratic party political control, because according to party ethics it
would be the duty of the senate to thwart the popular will. And,
supposing Mr. Cleveland and a republican House of Represent-
atives elected, it would be his duty according to the party code to
rule the country in defiance of both houses of Congress, or in
obedience to the will of the minority. This is monarchy in action,
under a democratic form. Or, suppose the people should vote
'
' no confidence " in the present House of Representatives by elect-
ing a republican majority to succeed it, the repudiated House
would pay no attention whatever to the message, but would go on
as if nothing had happened, with all sorts of post mortem legisla-
tion until the 4th of March. And, most monarchal of all, the new
Congress is not allowed to have anything to say about political
affairs until thirteen months after its election, unless convened in
extra session by the King, or as we call him here, the President.
I do not mean to say that the English system is better than the
American ; I merely claim that it is more democratic in its mode
of work, not better. Did I say better ? If so I withdraw the word,
for I have lately heard it said that the American plan because less
democratic is better than the English way. It is claimed by many
Americans as a merit of the constitution that so long as it remains
as it is now, democracy never can be triumphant in this land.
This is the ' ' conservative " opinion, and it may be correct, although
I prefer the more democratic wav.
*
* *
The Speaker of the British House of Commons is a very lofty
personage, one of the grandest in the kingdom, a dignitary so ex-
alted that ordinary mortals blink in the sunshine of his presence.
As he walks in state with the awful mace before him, his trailing
robes alone, to say nothing of his wig, transfigure him into another
Olympian Jove, and he speaks with the authority of thunder. He
has a kingly salary, and lives in a palace like a king, a palace pro-
vided for him, and furnished for him by the nation. He has a
chaplain, and a sword bearer, and a purse bearer, and a mace
bearer, and a train bearer, and secretaries, clerks, cooks, and bottle
washers without number. He holds also a peerage and a pension
in reversion. Radiant with aristocratic adornments he presides
over the House, and his baritone call to order will make even the
Prime Minister of England tremble and beg pardon like a school-
boy. It seems very strange, and yet it is very true that this gor-
geous potentate has not one twentieth as much political power as
is exercised by the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
Washington. The democracy long since deprived him of all that.
The form and ceremonials, the gewgaws aud the flummery, even
the dignity of the office he may enjoy, but he is not allowed the
control of legislation even to the extent of his own vote. He must
hold that in abeyance during his term of office lest the giving of it
should identify him with one party or the other. He must be ab-
solutely and democratically impartial, upholding the equal rights
of every member on the floor, and showing neither by voice nor
vote what his own preference is. Here again we see democratic
practice clad in robes of despotic theory, the exact reverse of what
we see at Washington, where the Speaker of the House in a dem-
ocratic uniform exercises arbitrary power, not only over the mem-
bers, but over every subject of legislation. He is every inch a
king. Let him put on a royal robe, and we will dethrone him in-
stantly, but he may rule as rudely as the imperial Czar if he be
careful to wear American clothes. He may smite us with an iron
hand if he will only wear upon it the glove of "republican sim-
plicity." It is the form of things we care for, not the substance.
*
In the development of the House of Commons it has come to
be the rqle that the Speakership shall be free from the vicissitudes
of politics, and whatever the party luck may be, the old speaker
shall be reelected by the new parliament, unless he declines to
serve. The speaker of the late House of Commons was Mr. Peel,
an opponent of Mr. Gladstone's policy, and it was therefore con-
ceded in America that by the organic law of politics Mr. Gladstone
would give that very fine office to one of his own followers, but to
our great astonishment, as soon as the new parliament met, a tory
member proposed that Mr. Peel be Speaker, and in what appears
to us to have been a moment of temporary insanity, Mr. Gladstone
seconded the nomination, whereupon Mr. Peel was elected by a
unanimous vote. To an American partisan that sort of thing is
entirely out of order, because by such eccentric action some "good
man " of the majority is cheated out of an office. It was an in-
spiring sight when the American editors brought their journalistic
telescopes to bear on Mr. Gladstone's head, exploring it for a rea-
son, like a party of astronomers investigating Mars. A Gladstonian
editor of one of " the great dailies " of Chicago, having a telescope
more powerful than the others, discovered the reason almost hid-
den away in the deep valley of Mr. Gladstone's cunning. "He
makes two votes by it," said this journalistic astronomer, " Behold
the political sagacity of the grand old man I As the Speaker does
not vote, the enemy loses one by having the speakership, while
Mr. Gladstone saves one for his own side ; and this makes two on
a division." Mr. Gladstone may not regard that praise as a very
high compliment, but the editor meant it as a flattering tribute to
the genius of a skilful politician. It is only fair to say that Mr.
Gladstone was actuated by a higher motive ; and the election of
the Speaker was in logical harmony with the law of impartiality
fixed upon the office. If the Speaker must not know either party,
it follows that both parties ought to strengthen his position by
their votes. If he must preserve the equal rights of every member
on the floor, it is only reciprocal fairness that every man should
vote for him. The unanimous vote for Speaker gives a very high
tone to parliament, and it shows the intellectual progress that fifty
years has made in the evolution of politics.
M. M. Trumbull.
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